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unless the grounds upon which the agency acted, in exercising its
power, were those upon which its action could be sustained. Baudin
v. Dulles 235, F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956). It has been decided that
if the agency's action is arbitrary the injured party win have the
right to judicial review. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, supra; Friend v. Lee, 221 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
It seems, therefore, that the decision of the principal case does
not vary from the rules already established concerning agency action.
This case will inhibit the use of publicity type enforcement techniques
if such techniques are used in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
On the other hand, if the press release is issued in a valid exercise
of the agency's authority and is in compliance with the law the
decision of the case will not affect it, for the courts will not interfere
in the valid exercise of an agency's power.
The courts in these situations are placed in a delicate position,
for they must not only promote the public's interest in the administration of the law but also safeguard the constitutional right of each
individual. But, as the cases indicate, the rights of the individual
rise higher than the preservation of enforcement techniques employed
by administrative agencies.
Thomas Franklin McCoy

Conflict of Laws-Wrongful Death Measure of Damages-Substantive or Procedural?
The intestate, a passenger of D's common carrier aircraft, was
killed in a crash in Massachusetts, the state of D's incorporation. P,
as administratrix of her husband's estate, brought suit in federal
district court, in New York, on diversity of citizenship. On appeal,
only the cause of action based on the Massachusetts wrongful death
act was considered. The district court applied the Massachusetts
statute, but refused to apply the 15,000 dollar limitation, as being
contrary to the public policy of New York. The circuit court
reversed. Upon rehearing, the court, sitting en bane, held, reversed
and affirmed the district court. If the foreign law normally applicable
violates the strongest moral convictions or appears profoundly unjust
at the forum, neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause nor the Due
Process Clause requires that the law be applied. Pearson v. North-
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east Airlines, Inc., 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2256 (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 1962).
It is a well settled principle of conflict of laws that the right to
maintain an action for wrongful death is governed by the law of
the place of the wrong subject to the qualification that if such law
is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum, the forum may,
in its discretion, refuse to enforce the right. Stewart v. Baltimore &
0. R.R., 168 U.S. 445 (1897); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Babcock,
154 U.S. 190 (1894); Royal Indem. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.,
272 App. Div. 246, 70 N.Y.S.2d 697, aff'd, 297 N.Y. 619, 75
N.E.2d 613 (1947). See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAW, § § 11, 92
(3rd ed. 1949); LEFLAR, CONFLICTS OF LAWS, § 48 (1959); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§ 391, 412, 147, 612 (1934).

Equally settled is the rule that the law of the forum governs all
matters procedural in nature while the law of the place of the
wrong governs all substantive matters. Franklin Sugar Refining Co.
v. Lipowicz, 247 N.Y. 465, 160 N.E. 916 (1928).
The court in the instant case, has applied the rule as laid
down as dictum by the New York court in Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526
(1961). The Kilberg Case, which arose from the same accident as
the instant case, held that the plaintiff could not maintain an action
for breach of contract in causing his intestate's death, but that this
did not preclude the plaintiff from recovering more than the $15,000
maximum specified in the Massachusetts act. The New York
court stated that the Massachusetts wrongful death action was not
only sustainable, but in applying this act the court would refuse
to apply the limitation of the Massachusetts statute because New
York public policy prohibits the imposition of limits on such damages.
In effect, the Kilberg case says that the question of damages is one
of procedure rather than one of substance. Judge Froessel, in
affirming dismissal of plaintiff's action for breach of contract, said
that the overwhelming weight of authority in New York and the
United States is in accord with the rule that the law of the place
of injury governs not only the existence of the cause of action for
wrongful death but also the measure of damages. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra. The New York court appears to have
placed its decision on alternative grounds-that New York public
policy prohibits the enforcement of the limitation, and that the
question of damages was procedural, rather than substantive, in
nature. Both grounds call for the application of the law of the forum.
Having determined that New York public policy prohibits the
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imposition of a limit on the amount recoverable by the New York
plaintiff, it seems unnecessary for the court to hold that the damage
issue is procedural. The great weight of judicial authority supports
the view that the measure and amount of damages recoverable for
wrongful death or a limitation on that amount are just as much
questions of substantive law, and therefore governed by the law of
the place where the fatal injury was inflicted, as the right to recover
for the wrongful death. Maynard v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 178
F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1949); Jackson v. Anthony, 282 Mass. 540, 185
N.E. 389 (1933); Royal Indem. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.,
272 App. Div. 246, 70 N.Y.S.2d 697, afI'd, 297 N.Y. 619, 75
N.E.2d 613 (1947); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99,
120 N.E. 198 (1918). For a collection of cases on this principle
listing twenty-four jurisdictions, including New York with the majority, see Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 759 (1951).
The dictum of the Kilberg case that is applied in the instant
case is based on Wooden v. Western N.Y. & P. R. Co., 126 N.Y. 10,
26 N.E. 1050 (1891). The doctrine of this case is criticized by
Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra. In the Loucks
case, although it was suggested the court might refuse to enforce a
right based upon a foreign statute "that outrages the public policy of
New York", the court held that a Massachusetts statute, similar to
the one in the instant case, must be enforced, despite the fact that
New York could not give them the same amount of damages as
the New York law would give if the wrong had occurred there.
Thus Judge Cardozo clearly indicated that the maximum damages
would be controlled by the Massachusetts statute.
At a later date the court refused to apply New York law as
to additional liability. It was held to be well established that a cause
of action for wrongful death and the extent of the damage recoverable is governed by the laws of the place where the injury causing
death was inflicted. Royal Indem. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.,
272 App. Div. 246, 70 N.Y.S.2d 697, aff'd, 297 N.Y. 619, 75
N.E.2d 613 (1947).
Since federal jurisdiction rests on diversity, it is well settled
that the court in the instant case is obliged to apply the law of the
forum, including its conflict of laws doctrine, unless some provision
of the Constitution of the United States precludes its application.
Klexon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
By a 2-1 majority, the court, in the first hearing of the instant case,
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held that the trial court's refusal to apply the limitation of the
Massachusetts statute violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Judge Irving
Kaufman, who dissented to the first decision of the Second Circuit,
stated that he believed that the dull conformity which would result
from the use of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a strait-jacket
confining the body of conflict of laws doctrine was far less desirable
than the results which would be achieved by a more flexible interpretation of the Constitution. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
307 F.2d 131 (2nd Cir. 1962).
In cases of this nature a court must decide between its own
conflict of laws rule and the policy which prohibits limitations on
wrongful death claims. Faced with such a choice, the forum cannot
possibly decide in favor of the latter policy and avoid, as the court
has attempted to do, doing violence to the former. There is a significant difference between public policy as a rule for the judicial
guidance of local affairs and as a rule of conflict of laws. Goodrich,
Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 VA. L. REv. 26 (1938). A
strong forum policy against a foreign substantive law has been held
to justify the forum's refusal to apply that law. See STRUMBERG,
CONFLICTS OF LAW 198 (2d ed. 1951). It may be urged, however,
that only violation of a "fundamental principle of justice" warrants
dismissal on that ground of a plaintiff's claim based on foreign law.
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra. The "fundamental policy" (of
the New York wrongful death statute) is that there shall be some
atonement for the wrong. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra. The
Massachusetts statute fulfills this policy and the court should
therefore have applied the Massachusetts law.
"Public policy" is one way to avoid the application of a choice
of law rule which the forum wishes to avoid. The objection of
the forum, thus, is not to the content of the foreign law but to its
own choice of law rule. Rather than to change or modify the
supposedly applicable rule the court may refuse on public policy
grounds to apply the law to which the rule makes reference. Paulsen
& Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLUm. L.
REv. 969 (1956). "Public policy" could serve as a kind of residual
equity principle to relieve against the harshness of a general rule as
it applies to a specific situation involving important foreign facts.
The recognition of public policy as a tool for doing substantial
justice in particular cases is a dangerous matter. Applied without
the strictest limitations it could undermine the usual conflict rules
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by causing refusal to grant recovery against a local defendant every
time he makes an improvident bargain. Paulsen & Sovern, "Public
Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 969 (1956).

The principal vice of the public policy concept is that it provides
a substitute for analysis. The concept stands in the way of careful
throught, of discriminating distinctions, and of true policy development in the conflict of laws. Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in
the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLuM. L. REV. 969 (1956).

Chief Justice Desmond in the Kilberg case rationalized his
decision by saying that an air traveler from New York might fly
over any one of the 14 jurisdictions that limit death case damages,
and because the plane might be forced down in any one of them,
the place of the injury becomes entirely fortuitous. He went on to
say that the court should protect its citizens against the unfair
treatment of the lawsuits which result from these disasters. Kilberg
v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d
526 (1961). Would this same protection be afforded a citizen of
another state who happen to board a plane in New York, or is
this protection reserved only for the citizens of that state? Judge
Kaufman in the instant case, indicates that New York's interest
in the welfare of its citizens extends beyond the economic and
human loss which they sustain since New York has assumed a
duty to provide for those unable to care for themselves. This would
seem to infer, that if the plaintiff had not been domiciled in New
York the rule of the Kilberg case would not apply. Assume that
a New Jersey citizen's representative sued in New York, and the
court in its discretion did not apply the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, and because of the possible full faith and credit question
decided not to apply the Kilberg dictum to a non-domiciliary plaintiff. The court then might well have denied the plaintiff the due
process or equal protection of the law guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
AMEICA ANNOTATED, 967-1170 (Corwin ed. 1952).

STATES

OF

Thus, the

Kilberg dictum making the application of the Massachusetts limitation turn on the citizenship of the plaintiff, creates a dilemma. If
the dictum is applied to all plaintiffs, regardless of citizenship, a
full faith and credit question may arise when the plaintiff is not a
New York citizen. If the dictum is applied only to citizens of
New York, and not to other plaintiffs, the equal protection and
privileges and immunities rights of the fourteenth amendment may
be denied.
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The West Virginia court has held in actions to recover for
wrongful death, that the law of the place of the wrong rather than
the law of the forum govern the right of action in this state. Keesee
v. Atlantic Grayhound Corp., 120 W. Va. 201, 197 S.E. 522 (1938).
The West Virginia court later said that the substantive law of the
foreign jurisdiction controls the right to recover and that the question of survivability of a cause of action was one of substantive law.
Tice v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. 144 W. Va. 24, 106
S.E.2d 107 (1958). These cases seem to indicate that West Virginia
would follow the majority, at least as to the procedural issue, and
be contra to the instant case.
By determining that the law of the place of the injury is
contrary to public policy of the forum and is procedural rather than
substantive, the court in the instant case concluded that the law
of the forum must be applied on the issue of damages. This view
tends to negate both the rationale of certain conflict of law rules
and the reason for their existance-namely, to prevent the outcome
of a lawsuit from differing according to the place chosen to institute
the suit. While the decision of the instant case is no doubt both
popular and benevolent, it seems to be an open invitation to forum
shopping. To avoid this, it seems that legislation need be enacted
either by New York to give a contract cause of action, or by the
Congress under the commerce power to provide that damage limitations in common carrier accidents would be unlawful and void.
By these methods it would be possible to achieve the same laudable
results as the Kilberg and the instant cases without resorting to the
legal reasoning found here.
Earl Moss Curry, Jr.

Criminal Law-Conspiracy-Consistency Rule
X and D were indicted on several counts, including criminal
conspiracy, and were tried jointly. D entered a plea of guilty to
the charges of conspiracy. He was sentenced on October 20, 1958.
Previously, on October 8, 1958, X had been tried on the conspiracy
charge and acquitted. D served one sentence and brought habeas
corpus to be released from serving the second consecutive sentence.
The lower court granted the writ and P, the warden, appealed. Held,
affirmed. In order for a court to have jurisdiction in a case it
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